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Abstract
The modern African judge will be the first to acknowledge that, in many senses, 
the problems faced by British judges in colonial Africa have not vanished. Almost 
one hundred percent of the African judiciary is now African. But even though 
there is no longer the gross disparity of national origin between a judge and his 
community, a judge often does not come from the particular locality whose ethnic 
law he is administering. A part from this ethnic question, there is an enormous 
educational and cultural gap between a senior judge with a western education 
and the ordinary families he may deal with. Thus, the judicial system may have 
moved from a problem of race and ethnicity to one of class.1
Introduction and context
A ‘religious cult’ emerged in Kenya during the colonial epoch (1930s) which 
(religion) preached that indigenous Africans might never reclaim their heritage 
as long as Western values dominated the socio-political milieu. At the height of  
its activity in the years after the Second World War, the main tenets of  this faith 
were that the Europeans should leave Kenya and that natives should return to 
the ways and religion of  their ancestors.2 The leaders of  the movement were 
1 Ocran M ‘The clash of  legal cultures: The treatment of  indigenous law in colonial and post-colonial 
Africa’ Akron Law Review (2006), 480.
2 Vermouth P ‘Rural rebels: Audrey Wipper and Dini ya Msambwa’ 13 International Journal of  African 
Historical Studies 2, 313.
* LLD (Cand), LLM (UP); LLB (UoN), Lecturer, Strathmore Law School
** PhD, MA (Moi Univ); BED (KU), Lecturer, Masinde Muliro University of Science, Agricul-
ture and Technology
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Elijah Masinde, Joash Walumoli, Benjamin Wekuke and Donnish Kakimayu. Dini 
ya Musambwa, as the religion came to be famed, fought for the reinstatement of  
African customary law. One of  the main items it proclaimed was the practice of  
polygamy observed in most Kenyan societies. An administrator during the colo-
nial era, Teddy Eggins, in 1949, saw this faith as: 
The cult of  the ancestral spirits… one of  those storms, or perhaps a mere shower, of  fanati-
cism – partly social, partly religious, partly nationalistic – which passes from time to time 
across the landscape of  history.3 
Based on similar sentiments, the colonial government proscribed the faith. 
In a recent interview with journalists, its current leader lamented: “just the way 
Masinde was frustrated and harassed by the Government during the colonial 
days and after independence, we have equally not been spared.”4 Not only have 
successive governments troubled this religious group, but also, its principal pillar 
– the reinstatement of  African customary law – has faced consistent yet subtle 
onslaughts from amongst others, the State itself. This investigation concerns this 
important pillar of  the proscribed faith of  Dini ya Musambwa. The contribution 
examines whether the major aspiration of  this faith and others, of  having indige-
nous Africans enjoy and observe their cultural and religious usages and practices, 
embedded in their customary laws, has been achieved more than seven decades 
after the faith was proscribed. 
We argue that apart from the Christian faith, customs, laws and values con-
sistent with it, any other religion or custom is certain to find the Kenyan legal 
system not very hospitable. Religious and cultural traditions not analogous to 
Christianity or English common law stand to face stiff  opposition and obstruc-
tions, firstly, from the Constitution itself, then general Acts of  Parliament and 
judicial precedents, Western traditions and even international human rights in-
struments to which Kenya is party. This remains the case despite nascent consti-
tutional stipulations providing that every person has the right to participate in the 
cultural life of  choice5 and to enjoy the person’s culture.6 The Constitution also 
makes it illegal to “compel another person to perform, observe or undergo any 
cultural practice or rite”.7
3 Bellers V, ‘What Mr Sanders really did’ www.britishempire.co.uk/article/sanders/sanderschapter21.
htm on 8 November 2006. 
4 ‘A sect that believes in God, but not Jesus or Holy Spirit’ East African Standard 1 November 2004.
5 Article 44(1), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
6 Article 44(2)(a), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
7 Article 44(3), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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This investigation is conducted through the eyes of  African customary law, 
against which multi-faceted battles have been wedged, most of  which it has lost. 
African customary law is defined here to imply:
[r]ules of  custom, morality, and religion that the indigenous people of  a given locality view as en-
forceable either by the central political system or authority, in the case of  very serious forms 
of  misconduct, or by the various social units such as the family…8
Reference to African customary law could, therefore, very well be reference 
to traditional custom, morality or religion. It is, indeed, true that the values of  
western society are embodied in common law; even as values of  traditional Afri-
can society are embodied in their customary law.9 
The state of customary law and practices in Kenya’s legal system
The rise of  colonial rule in Kenya was the beginning of  the fall of  African 
traditional religion, custom and law. For an in depth appreciation of  this develop-
ment, we discuss African customary law first through its historical phases – the 
pre-colonial period; the colonial period; and the post-colonial period – before 
alluding to the limitations it currently faces by dint of  the Constitution of  Kenya 
2010, Acts of  Parliament, international law, case law and common law.
African customary law before colonialism
African social and political systems did not experience a linear trajectory 
throughout the pre-colonial period. One could argue that before the fifteenth 
century, the African hinterlands practiced largely pure, indigenous or authentic 
traditional lifestyles. As shown below, matters changed drastically once the ‘visi-
tors’ put their imprint on the continental landscape. 
african customary law and systems before visitation 
Africans had their own authentic methods of  operating governance and 
justice systems which are difficult to reconcile with the now dominant western 
approaches. Although some traditional societies such as the Wanga of  Kenya, 
Baganda of  Uganda, and Zulu of  South Africa qualified to be called ‘states’, 
8 Ocran, ‘The clash of  legal cultures’, 467-468. Emphasis supplied.
9 van Doren JW ‘Death African style: The case of  SM Otieno’ American Journal of  Comparative Law 
(1988), 330.
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most others lacked a centralised political authority, and functioned without codi-
fied law or regular systems of  taxation.10 Instead, 
[s]ocial cohesion was obtained through custom and consensus, not only within families but 
within clans and, as far as possible, between clans. Internally within the group there was 
minimal use of  force and coercion, and greater reliance on traditional precedent.11 
Regulation in the traditional African sense therefore entailed more than 
just coercive laws or formal policies issuing from official governance structures. 
There was room for customs and related moral principles which were often ex-
erted without physical police or tangible criminal sanctions. 
Almost every community had its method of  celebrating marriage, divorce, 
death and conducting other social transactions. Even criminal law was explained 
in terms of  these usages. The Maasai, for instance, practiced self-help in which 
it was the prerogative of  a murdered person’s family to go after the murderer 
subject to the possibility of  accepting the so called ‘blood money’ as civil dam-
ages, in lieu of  death.12 The people of  Somali extraction have a similar tradition, 
which survives to date.13
It is also important to mention that pre-colonial African systems were pre-
dominated by religion which permeated nearly all aspects of  life to the extent of  
making the separation of  faith from action illusory.14 Practitioners of  traditional 
African religion have been known to experience their faith long before birth, 
throughout life, and way after death. As John Mbiti ably demonstrates, 
[W]here the African is, there is his religion: he carries it to the fields where he is sowing seeds 
or harvesting a new crop; he takes it with him to the beer party or to attend a funeral cer-
10 Mazrui AA, The Africans: A triple heritage, Little, Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto, 1986, 68.
11 Mazrui, The Africans, 69.
12 Ocran, ‘The clash of  legal cultures’, 473-474.
13 On this basis a lawyer of  a complainant family recently moved the High Court in Kenya to terminate 
a murder trial citing the fact that: “The two families have sat and some form of  compensation 
has taken place wherein camels, goats and other traditional ornaments were paid to the aggrieved 
family. Actually one of  the rituals that have been performed is said to have paid for blood of  the 
deceased to his family as provided for under the Islamic law and customs. These two families have 
performed the said rituals, the family of  the deceased is satisfied that the offence committed has 
been fully compensated to them under the Islamic laws and customs applicable in such matters 
and in the foregoing circumstances, they do not wish to pursue the matter any further be it in 
court or any other forum …”. As if  to corroborate the above averments, Abdow Alio Ibrahim, the 
deceased’s father, further testified in an affidavit before court: “it’s worth noting that it goes against 
our tradition to pursue the matter any further and/or testify against the accused person once we 
have received full compensation in the matter of  which we already have ... it’s our instruction that 
the matter and/or court case be withdrawn as our family wishes to put a stop to the matter.” Republic 
v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed, Criminal Case No 86 of  2011.
14 For fuller treatment, see Magesa L, What is not sacred: African spirituality, Acton Publishers, Nairobi, 
2013.
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emony; and if  he is educated, he takes religion with him to the examination room at school 
or in the university; if  he is a politician he takes it to the house of  parliament.15 
Since traditional religion accompanied its subjects in virtually every under-
taking, the law in pre-colonial societies has to be cast against a context whereby 
“belief  in the supernatural, and law may be fused and mutually supportive”.16 
african customary systems after visitation
By the sixteenth century, Islam and Christian values had begun to slowly 
percolate the ‘dark continent’. At the East African Coast, Portuguese and other 
civilisations had already begun to have influence. Arab traders and European mis-
sionaries had not only extended economic and political muscle, but also religious 
and cultural influence. They introduced unique civilisations, and their legacy in-
cluded inputting into the local languages, cultures, political and social systems, 
agriculture, architecture, trade, and religion, amongst others.17 In West Africa;
[T]he religion of  Islam had been firmly rooted in many societies in sub-Saharan Africa since 
the fifteenth century. Islam entered Hausa land in the early fourteenth century. About 40 
Wangarawa traders brought Islam with them, and during the reign of  Muhammad Rumfa 
between 1463 and 1499, Islam was firmly rooted in Kano.18
At the same time, imperialists had begun peeping at the African tent with 
the view to occasioning phenomenal transformation through systematic imposi-
tion of  novel social, political and legal systems in which their distinct values were 
embedded. According to Lord Lugard – the author of  colonialism in east, west 
15 Mbiti JS, African religions and philosophy, Heinemann, Nairobi, 1969, 142.
16 van Doren JW, ‘African tradition and western common law: A study in contradiction’ in Ojwang JB 
and Mugambi JNK (eds) The SM Otieno case: Death and burial in modern Kenya, Nairobi University Press, 
1989, 128.
17 See for instance, Martin BG, ‘Arab migrations to East Africa in medieval times’ 7 International Journal 
of  African Historical Studies 3, (1974) 367. Also, Oliver R,Atmore A, Africa since 1800, 5ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, 30-31. It is also documented that “between around 700 and 1500 AD, a 
majority of  Muslim visitors to East Africa probably concerned with some aspect of  trade”. See for 
instance, Martin BG ‘Arab migrations to East Africa in medieval times’, 367, 375.
18 Taiwo EA, ‘Justifications, challenges and constitutionality of  the penal aspects of  Shari’ah law in 
Nigeria’ 17 Griffith Law Review 1 (2008), 184, 185. Regarding the introduction of  Islamic customary 
law and its institutions, Yadudu has written: “The Islamic legal order was brought to the pre-colonial 
part of  Nigeria with the conversion of  the people to Islam. This began in the 9th century with the 
Kanem Borno and spread in the 11th century to the rest of  the region. However, the widespread 
application of  the Islamic law and the formalization of  its judicial structures occurred only during 
the early part of  the 19th century with the establishment of  the Sokoto caliphate. This had occurred 
much earlier on a smaller scale under the Saifawa dynasty of  Borno”. See, Yadudu AH, ‘Colonialism 
and the transformation of  Islamic law’ 32 Journal of  Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (1992), 103, 110.
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and parts of  southern Africa19 – the advent of  Europeans brought with it the 
mind and methods of  Europe.20 And the revolution was a fusion of  material de-
velopment, education and progress.21 These outcomes were expected given that 
part of  the ‘dual mandate’ pursued by British imperialism was the,
[t]ask of  civilisation to put an end to slavery, to establish courts of  law, to inculcate in the 
natives a sense of  individual responsibility, of  liberty, of  justice, and to teach their rulers how 
to apply these principles; above all, to see to it that the system of  education should be such 
as to produce happiness and progress.22
None of  these developments, however, posed substantial threats to African 
religion, custom and law save for in so far as they converted and assimilated ‘na-
tives’ into the new cultures, oftentimes at the chagrin of  the traditional ways of  
life. The conversion was mostly though persuasion and interaction. Even then, 
most Africans continued to practice their traditional customs as well as the new 
religions and cultures. The three civilisations, traditional African religion/cus-
toms, Christianity and Islam, would latter play a significant role in not only East 
Africa, but also the continent as a whole. Ali Mazrui has conceptualised that 
Africa can best be understood in the light of  this ‘triple heritage’. According to 
this account: 
The twentieth century witnessed the full flowering of  Africa’s triple heritage (Africanity, Islam, 
and Westernization). This has developed into a major new paradigm for interpreting Africa 
– for viewing the continent as a convergence of  three civilizations.23
19 Regarding the conquest of  the relevant regions of  Africa, Lugard has written: “During the first half  
of  these thirty years, it was my privilege to assist in some degree in bringing under British control 
portions of  Nyasaland, East Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria…” See, Lugard F, The dual mandate in British 
tropical Africa, 5ed, Frank Cass & Co, 1965, 7.
20 Lugard, The dual mandate, 5.
21 Lugard, The dual mandate, 5.
22 Lugard, The dual mandate, 5. 
23 Mazrui AA, ‘The re-invention of  Africa: Edward Said, VY Mudimbe, and beyond’ 36 Research in 
African Literatures 3, (Fall 2005), 68, 76. Of  this aspect, it has also been noted: “Professor Ali Mazrui 
… argues that African culture today must be “understood best in terms of  its ‘triple heritage’, of  
indigenous, Islam, and western forces, which had arisen out of  an ancient confluence of  indigenous, 
Semitic, and Greco-Roman forces.” Consequently, the combination of  these diverse cultures and 
current trends in globalisation have immensely disturbed the purity of  African customary values. 
Thus, an African cultural tradition may, therefore, mean much more than extant traditional practices. 
Indeed, it may impute a blend of  traditional African values, western way of  life, and even Asiatic 
values or traditional practices.” See, Juma L, ‘Reconciling African customary law and human rights 
in Kenya: Making a case for institutional reformation and revitalization of  customary adjudication 
processes’ Saint Thomas Law Review (2002), 475.
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Traditional African customary law during the colonial epoch
The Berlin Conference (1884-85) could rightly be said to have officially 
flagged off  the act and art of  colonialism in Africa. Consequently, the British 
made Kenya a protectorate on 15 June 1895.24 Thereafter, the British found out 
that traditional African societies did not have law in the Anglo-American sense. 
This allowed them to pass an Executive Order in Council in 1897 which pro-
claimed the reception of  English law into Kenya and declared the supremacy 
of  common law over customary law where there was an overlap.25 This way, the 
British were able using foreign laws to permeate all spheres of  African life, in-
cluding marriage, property relations and criminal justice.
Colonialism had the profound effect of  delivering the East African le-
gal jurisdiction to the Crown at the Westminster. Henceforth, the Westminster 
institutions would make laws for East Africa, just as in the United Kingdom. 
Behind the façade of  the imposition of  western legal implements was the tacit 
articulation of  foreign values and religion in East Africa. While there was noth-
ing wrong with the introduction of  foreign values (after all change had been 
happening in Africa ever since the initial acts of  colonisation, and even fur-
ther back with trade and conflict driven migration), the new masters sought to 
proscribe certain African cultural laws and practices. As illustrated by the R v 
Amkeyo26 case discussed later in this contribution, the British accepted African 
customary law and religion to some extent, but also riddled it with the so called 
‘repugnancy clauses’, in order to avoid those aspects of  African customs that 
European culture found most appalling, ridiculous, or simply unhelpful to the 
inculcation of  Christian ideals.27
However, colonial authorities made some concessions permitting local 
communities to observe their own customary laws in limited circumstances, and 
towards this end, a parallel system of  courts was established to administer jus-
tice to the indigenous people. The Native Tribunals Ordinance empowered the 
tribunals to administer:
[t]he native law and custom prevailing in the area of  the jurisdiction of  the tribunal so far as 
it is not repugnant to justice or morality or inconsistent with the provisions of  any Order in 
Council or with any other law in force in the colony.28
24 van Doren ‘Death African style’, 331.
25 van Doren ‘Death African style’, 331.
26 R v Amkeyo (1917) 7 EALR 14.
27 Ocran, ‘The clash of  legal cultures’, 467-468.
28 Section 13(a), Native Tribunals Ordinance. 
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A development similar to this (in South Africa) has been succinctly docu-
mented:29
In 1927, the Native Administration Act applied the system of  indirect rule in a uniform way 
across the whole of  what had by then become the Union of  South Africa. An important 
feature of  the place so accorded to indigenous law was the extent to which it was officially 
recognized. Only those parts of  the law which did not conflict with colonial interest and 
control were given official support. The practical result was that white indigenous rules of  
marriage, family law, and succession were permitted to survive, the system of  land own-
ership was indigenous in form only, and all significant jurisdictions over criminal matters 
passed into the hands of  colonial officials.
It is instructive that local populations continued to observe their customs 
sometimes even adjudicating criminal conflicts according to their traditional 
norms.30
State of African customary law in post-colonial Kenya
Two kinds of  emotions characterised the fortunes of  African customary 
law in post-colonial Africa (including Kenya); first a fear for English common 
law by departing colonialists, and second a persistent fear for African customary 
law by those sympathetic to its wellbeing. The fear by the authors and stable-
keepers of  the colonial faith concerned the future of  imposed laws given the 
euphoria and threats caused by independence and the prospect of  indigenisation 
respectively. According to Okoth-Ogendo, it was feared that:
[t]he wave of  nationalism then sweeping through black Africa would uproot colonialism’s 
most precious contributions to the future development of  the continent, namely the imposi-
tion of  an Anglo-European system of  law and legal ordering. For English-speaking Africa, 
it was feared that ‘the common law of  England and the doctrines of  equity’ might be swept 
away and replaced with a static, unwritten regime of  ‘native law and custom’ the ascertain-
ment of  which depended on the fading memories of  octogenarians living in a continent 
notorious for high mortality levels.31 
But these fears would soon be assuaged, as it became manifest the emerg-
ing African elite preferred to operate the western systems in which they were 
schooled. Thus, once the euphoric waves associated with independence had set-
tled, it was time for sympathisers of  African customary law to lament the relega-
29 du Bois F, Visser D, ‘The influence of  foreign law in South Africa’ Translational Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2003), 600.
30 van Doren ‘Death African style’, 332.
31 Okoth-Ogendo HWO, ‘Customary law in the Kenyan legal system: An old debate revived’ in Ojwang 
and Mugambi, The SM Otieno case, 135.
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tion of  indigenous customary laws and systems, which had, and continue to be, 
effected in multifarious ways. Since independence, African customary law has 
suffered tremendous usurpations on the juridical front. These limitations have 
been possible because of  the Constitution, Acts of  Parliament, judicial decisions, 
and the human rights movement. The following subsection now turns to address 
each of  these items and how they have affected the healthy stay of  African cus-
tomary law.
the Constitution
The Constitution of  Kenya32 is the most significant legal instrument in the 
legal system. The foremost legislation impacts on traditional African religion and 
customary practices in three ways significant to this study. Firstly, according to 
its Article 2(1), the Constitution “is the supreme law of  the Republic and binds 
all persons and all State organs at both levels of  government”. Thus, “any law, 
including customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the 
extent of  the inconsistency”.33 African customary law has, therefore, to conform 
to the Constitution if  it has to be considered legally sound and valid. Otherwise, 
such practices remain void to the extent of  their inconsistency with the Consti-
tution. Put differently, the Constitution offers the first most important yardstick 
against which the relevance of  all other laws, religions, customs, and practices 
are measured. For instance, although the Constitution allows Parliament to enact 
legislation recognising marriages conducted under any tradition, or system of  
religious, personal or family law,34 such marriages must be consistent with the 
Constitution to be acceptable.35 
Secondly, the Constitution stipulates that no one shall be tried for a crimi-
nal offence unless it amounts to an offence under the laws of  the State or under 
international law.36 This provision alone has the effect of  rendering the entire 
African customary criminal law invalid. This is because African customs are 
hardly written and even then only recognised formal legislative structures such 
as Parliament are allowed to enact criminal law. It implies that the entire corpus 
of  African customary offences is dead except for those traditional crimes that 
32 Revised Edition 2010, Published by the National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of  
the Attorney General.
33 Article 2(4), Constitution of  Kenya (2010). Emphasis added.
34 Article 45(4)(a), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
35 Article 45(4)(b), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
36 Article 50(2)(n), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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have secured legislative articulation. As explained earlier in this contribution, Af-
rican societies recognised numerous offenses and crimes, which were handled 
by local people according to traditional norms.37 These crimes are no longer 
acknowledged given the supremacy of  the Constitution and Parliament in the 
penal realm; and especially after the independence state failed to seize an initial 
window in the Independence Constitution paving way for the codification of  
African customary crimes within the three-year grace period stipulated.38 Thus, 
the subject became entirely extinguished on 12 December 1966.39
The third way in which the Constitution restricts customary law and reli-
gion is through certain other subtle provisions whose overall effect is to sideline 
traditional practices. An example of  such provision is one in the Bill of  Rights 
requiring that the youth be “protected from harmful cultural practices”.40 Among 
the harmful traditions from which the youth are to be protected, obviously, are 
practices such as female genital mutilation, a central custom in many African 
traditions. Similarly, under the Constitution, the right to marry is a preserve of  
persons of  opposite sex, meaning that woman-to-woman marriages prevalent 
in most African communities are not authorised. This obstacle to customary 
law was however partly surmounted in Monica Jesang Katam v Jackson Chepkwony 
& Another,41 where JB Ojwang J (as he then was) did not hesitate to protect the 
inheritance rights of  a woman married to another under Nandi customary law, 
a juridical process that could have legitimised such practices. The judge found 
that the petitioner “was a ‘wife’, and, by the operative customary law, she and her 
sons belonged to the household of  the deceased, and were entitled to inherit-
ance rights, prior to anyone else”. Same sex marriage could therefore be read into 
the scheme of  the Law of  Succession Act,42 placing the petitioner and her children 
in the first line of  inheritance: the petitioner herself  for being ‘wife of  the de-
ceased’, and her children for being the children of  the deceased. Under this genre 
of  customary marriages:
A woman past the age of  [among the Nandi and Kipsigis] child-bearing and who has no 
sons, may enter into a form of  marriage with another woman. This may be done during 
the lifetime of  her husband, but is more usual after his death. Marriage consideration is 
paid, as in regular marriage, and a man from the woman’s husband’s clan has intercourse 
with the girl in respect of  whom marriage consideration has been paid. Any children born 
37 van Doren ‘Death African style’, 332.
38 Cotran E, The law of  marriage and divorce, Vol. 1 Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1968, 155.
39 Cotran, The law of  marriage and divorce, 155.
40 Article 55(d), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
41 [2011] eKLR
42 Section 29, (Cap 160).
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to the girl are regarded as the children of  the woman who paid marriage consideration and 
her husband.43
There are however, certain concessions in the Bill of  Rights tending to 
give Islamic customary law a place in the legal system. The Bill of  Rights’ 
equality provisions are for example qualified to the extent strictly necessary for 
the application of  Islamic law before Kadhi’s courts, to persons who profess 
the Islamic faith, in matters relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and 
inheritance.44
Parliamentary/legislative enactments
The onslaught against African customary law has not been the preserve of  
the Constitution. Numerous Acts of  Parliament have been enacted some which 
deal a severe blow to African customary law and religion. This incidence, it would 
appear, has not been a practice peculiar to Kenya. In Mthembu v Letsela, Judge 
Mynardt reckoned a similar development in southern Africa:
The radical amelioration of  the common law has hitherto been a function of  Parliament; 
there is no reason to believe that Parliament will not continue to exercise that function.45
In postcolonial Kenya, the earliest legislation to directly alter African 
customary law was the Magistrates Courts Act (1967), which gave magistrates 
the jurisdiction to entertain claims under customary law. At Section 2 of  this 
legislation, a “claim under customary law” is defined as any claim concerning: 
land held under customary tenure; marriage, divorce, maintenance or dowry; 
seduction or pregnancy of  unmarried woman or girl; enticement of  or adultery 
with a married woman; and divorce under customary law. This provision has 
evoked great confusion.46 Questions have arisen regarding whether the list 
effectively dismisses the adjudication of  other strands of  African customary law 
in the magistrate’s court, more so given the fact that it omits certain pertinent 
matters such as claims affecting children, compensation, adoption and testate 
succession.47
Besides the magistrate courts, the jurisdiction of  other courts was deter-
mined by the Judicature Act of  1967 which stipulates:
43 Cotran, The law of  marriage and divorce, 117.
44 Article 24(4), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
45 Cited in Omotoal JA, ‘Primogeniture and illegitimacy in African customary law: The battle for 
survival of  culture’ Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (2004), 120.
46 Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 466-467.
47 Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 466-467.
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The jurisdiction of  the High Court, the Court of  Appeal and of  all subordinate courts shall 
be exercised in conformity with – (a) the Constitution; (b) subject thereto, all other written 
laws, including the Acts of  Parliament of  the United Kingdom cited in Part I of  the Sched-
ule to this Act, modified in accordance with Part II of  that Schedule; (c) subject thereto and 
so far as those written laws do not extend or apply, the substance of  the common law, the 
doctrines of  equity and the statutes of  general application in force in England on the 12th 
August, 1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of  justice in England at 
that date; but the common law, doctrines of  equity and statues of  general application shall 
apply so far only as the circumstances of  Kenya and its inhabitants permit and subject to 
such qualifications as those circumstances may render necessary.
The High Court, the Court of  Appeal and all subordinate courts shall be guided by African 
customary law in civil cases in which one or more of  the parties is subject to it or affected by 
it, so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with 
any written law, and shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice without undue 
regard to technicalities of  procedure and without undue delay.48 
This piece of  legislation commits at least five cardinal wrongs against 
African customary law. Firstly, going by the order in which the different 
sources of  law are mentioned, it creates a hierarchy of  norms according to 
which African customary law is of  least significance. The very isolation of  
African customary law, as a source of  law, to a different and latter sub-section 
is testimony to this fact. It does not help matters that even English Acts of  
Parliament applicable on or before 12 August 1897 are superior to indigenous 
law. Further, English customary law in the nature of  common law and doctrines 
of  equity comes before African customary law in terms of  ranking. Yet, as 
Horsfall J once noted, these doctrines embody Christian values. In the Judge’s 
own words:
It would be wrong to apply principles of  equity, which were devised to suit Christian society 
in England during the last century in order to import a presumption whereby to gauge the 
intention of  a Muslim husband and wife living in present day Zanzibar whose social and 
cultural background is very different from that of  Victorian England.49
Secondly, the law reasserts the prime status of  the Constitution as a source 
of  law. This study has already noted that the Constitution contains provisions 
that are out rightly insensitive to African customary practices. 
Thirdly, the Act does not list African customary law as a binding source 
of  law. Rather, courts of  law are merely required to be ‘guided’ by this body of  
law. That wording is unique to African customary law and must be telling of  its 
48 Section 3(1) and (2), Judicature Act (Cap 8).
49 Raya Binti v Hamed Bin Suleiman (1962) EA 248.
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insignificance in Kenya’s legal system. As a way forward, Cotran suggested that 
“the word ‘guided’ in Section 3(2) of  the Judicature Act should be replaced by 
the word ‘apply’”.50
Fourthly, the section reiterates the fact that African customary law shall 
only be limited to civil matters that affect either party to a dispute. In other 
words, African customary civil law would apply to only those who are affected 
by or subjected to it. This, again, is an affirmation that the entire body of  African 
customary criminal law has no application in Kenya. 
Fifthly, the legislation introduces the ‘repugnancy clause’, which has invari-
ably served as slow poison against the quest to apply African customary law. The 
repugnancy test usually entails weighing African customary practices against the 
‘ideal’ that is western values. According to Justice Ocran of  Ghana:
The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs perceived to be against 
Christian values and morality or cruel and unusual standards of  the colonizers. There were 
various formulations of  these clauses. Some stated that the rules should not be repugnant 
to “natural justice, equity and good conscience.” Others read: “Not contrary to [religious] 
justice, morality or order.” Still others read: “Not repugnant to morality, humanity or natural 
justice or injurious to the welfare of  the natives.”51
Ruling on a related issue, a British judge in an East African colonial court 
(in 1938) frankly stated that: 
I have no doubt whatever that the only standard of  justice and morality which a British court 
in Africa can apply is its own British standard. Otherwise we should find ourselves in certain 
circumstances having to condone such things, for example, as the institution of  slavery.
On this basis, then, the justice of  applying to the present circumstances the native ‘law’ 
which has been postulated in this case must be decided. Is it just according to our ideas to 
take away a man’s property in order to compensate a party who has suffered injury at the 
hands of  a man’s son, the son being of  full age and fully responsible in law for his own ac-
tions? I hold most strongly the opinion that it is not just.52
Yet another colonial ruling failed not conceal its contempt for certain indig-
enous practices: Said the Privy Council in Re Southern Rhodesia;
Some tribes are so low in the scale of  social organisation that their usages and conception 
of  rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institution or legal ideas of  civilised 
society.53
50 Cotran, The law of  marriage and divorce, 150.
51 Ocran, ‘The clash of  legal cultures’, 475.
52 Gwao bin Kilimo v Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938) 1 TLR (R) 403.
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Following this train of  thought, in Kenya, the test for repugnancy has most-
ly been one of  common law. During the colonial era, the test governing when a 
custom is deemed repugnant to morality or justice was whether it could be said 
to be repugnant “as the people of  England see it.”54 The case of  R v Amkeyo il-
lustrates this point perhaps more than any other precedent. In this decision, a 
colonial court ruled that a marriage in respect of  African customary law could 
not stand because native traditions cannot support a marriage in the proper sense 
of  the word. Hence, the colonial court, apart from declaring such a ‘marriage’ re-
pugnant to justice and morality, also went further to describe such a relationship 
pegged on payment of  dowry (and not limited in the number of  women one can 
marry) simply as ‘wife purchase’. Chief  Justice Hamilton’s entered the following 
memorable dicta:
In my opinion, the use of  the word ‘marriage’ to describe the relationship entered into by 
an African native with a woman of  his tribe according to tribal custom is a misnomer which 
has led in the past to considerable confusion of  ideas. I know of  no word that correctly de-
scribes it; ‘wife-purchase’ is not altogether satisfactory, but it comes much nearer to the idea 
than that of  ‘marriage’ as generally understood among civilised peoples.
As far as the Kenyan legal system is concerned, the substance of  African 
customary law remains principally in the fields of  contract law, tort law, family 
law and land law.55 But even in these spheres, statutory law has been eating away 
ground. For instance, the (2001) enactment of  the Children Act withheld all 
manner of  items pertaining to children from the domains of  African customary 
religion and law. The Law of  Succession Act, passed in 1981, currently super-
sedes all forms of  applicable customary, Hindu or Islamic laws of  succession. In 
the end, African customary law is left with very limited spheres of  influence in 
the legal system and perhaps Okoth-Ogendo was accurate in observing that at 
the rate at which legislatures in Africa were churning out statutes based on An-
glo-European jurisprudence, customary law would be lying “in a juridical morgue 
waiting to be buried beneath unyielding legislative tombstones”.56
the human rights discourse
The discourse on human rights in Kenya is currently dominated by sustained 
condemnation of  the institutions of  customary law and religion that have failed 
54 This was the test enumerated in Regina v Luke Marangula, Reports of  Northern Rhodesia (1949-54), 
140.
55 Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 480.
56 Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Customary law in the Kenyan legal system’, 136.
55
the wretched african traditionalists in Kenya. . .
Strathmore Law JournaL, June 2015
to satisfy the demands of  international human rights law.57 Undeniably, argues 
Juma, such condemnation has exalted pursuits for gender-sensitive programmes 
and policies, heralded the demand for the repeal of  unjust legislation, and bol-
stered general awareness of  international human rights instruments – albeit to 
some significant levels.58 In the process, traditional religious and customary prac-
tices such as female circumcision amongst the Maasai, wife inheritance amongst 
the Luo, traditional boy initiation amongst the Bukusu, and polygamy amongst 
many African civilisations have suffered tremendous bereavements. 
Additionally, the post colonial reception of  constitutional and human rights 
law provides the framework in which the legal capacity of  the colonial transplan-
tation of  European law into a territory with its own indigenous legal traditions is 
still being confronted. Obviously, courts of  traditional leaders can no longer be 
permitted to exercise functions in terms of  indigenous law that fall foul of  the 
trias politica principle that is applied to courts of  European descent.59 It suffices to 
state that the human rights discourse is one major front through which custom-
ary law and religion continue to suffer. 
Case law
It is already clear that African customary law in Kenya can also be under-
stood through the prisms of  judicial precedents. This contribution has already 
alluded to R v Amkeyo, a judicial decision that belittled African customary law 
during the colonial period. The most significant decision in the postcolonial era, 
perhaps, is the Otieno case.60 When SM Otieno a prominent lawyer died in 1986, 
a protracted legal battle ensued over his place for burial. This dispute pitted the 
widow, Wambui Otieno, against the deceased’s brother and members of  the de-
ceased’s clan. Specifically, they objected to her announced intention to bury the 
remains of  her late husband in Nairobi. Efforts to resolve the matter amicably 
failed after the widow labelled the clan members as thieves merely interested 
in ‘looting’ her house. Consequently, she filed suit in the High Court seeking a 
declaration entitling her to claim her husband’s body from the City Mortuary 
and perform the burial ceremony. She also sought injunctive orders restraining 
the clan from ever removing or in any way interfering with the remains of  the 
deceased until the dispute was resolved. The clan contested this claim on the 
57 Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 493.
58 Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 493.
59 du Bois, Visser, ‘The influence of  foreign law in South Africa’, 594, 595.
60 For a detailed analysis of  the case, see Juma, ‘Reconciling African customary law’, 482.
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grounds that the deceased was a Luo, and, thus, needed to be buried in accord-
ance with Luo custom. They indicated that Luo custom demanded that a person 
of  the deceased’s stature had to be buried in his ancestral home. 
The protagonists articulated their claims differently. While the widow’s 
claim was based on the English common law right of  a wife to bury her hus-
band, the clan members appealed to the customarian responsibility imparted by 
the instrumentality of  Luo customary law. The case was adjudicated up to the 
highest court of  the land, the Court of  Appeal, which decided in favour of  Luo 
customary law. The Court argued that when it comes to matters of  personal 
law such as death and burial rites, it is the customary law of  the deceased that 
applies.
This finding is a mixed bag in that it impacts on African customary law in 
at least five divergent ways. One, the decision is evidence of  the fact that African 
customary law could still have a place in Kenya’s legal system, after all. Two, the 
decision laid to rest the argument that customary law can be held to be repugnant 
to justice and morality in cases where it simply differs from western rules on the 
subject.61 In fact, the Otieno case found that the two systems of  law, common law 
and African customary law were not mutually exclusive and that they were meant 
to compliment each other. However, the decision did not settle the question re-
garding the juridical status of  African customary law vis-à-vis other legal norms 
in the hierarchy of  norms. Three, as Eugene Cotran has argued, the judgement 
drew a line through the colonial notion, spelled out in the case of  Cole v Cole62 
in 1898, that an educated, urbanised African escapes customary law. The Court 
of  Appeal rejected this approach arguing instead that it matters not that the 
deceased was sophisticated, urbanised and developed a different lifestyle.63 The 
tribunal held that “it seems to us quite unsustainable… that a different formal 
education and an urban lifestyle can affect adherence to one’s personal law”.64 
Four, the very act of  adjudicating African customary law before modern tribu-
nals fashioned on western constitutional ideals robs African customary law of  its 
very innate character. African customary law is ideally an unwritten discipline.65 
Disputes under this tradition are usually determined by traditional structures that 
mostly seek reconciliation rather than a ‘winner takes all’ mentality. By litigating 
this dispute before a modern tribunal composed of  members not culturally or-
61 Manji A, ‘Of  the laws of  Kenya and burials and all that’ Law and Literature (2002), 465.
62 Cole v Cole (1898) 1 NLR 15.
63 Manji, ‘Of  the laws of  Kenya and burials’, 465.
64 Cotran E, Casebook on Kenya customary law, 1988, Case No. 88.
65 Ocran, ‘The clash of  legal cultures’, 467-468.
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dained to interpret such traditions, African customary law lost its very essence. 
Five, the decision did not endeavour to expand the scope of  African customary 
law, but rather, limited its interpretation of  customary law only to matters con-
cerning personal law. Hence, the decision is not indicative of  whether there is a 
possibility of  expanding customary law to other areas, some of  which, as stated 
above, statutory enactments have since rushed to occupy.
In lieu of conclusion
In lieu of  conclusion, it is submitted that the ideal of  Dini ya Musambwa of  
having African customary law regain prominence has not been achieved just as 
the faith has yet to be accepted. Quite to the contrary, each coming day witnesses 
the crucification of  African customs in preference of  novel values mostly origi-
nating from western traditions and value systems. Indigenous practices whether 
religious, moral or customary have to contend with the fact that there are offi-
cial restrictions both express and tacit. In this regard, one may safely argue that 
customary freedom is not achievable by a significant portion of  the mostly rural 
populations in Kenya. Although both international law and the Constitution pro-
vide for the right to culture and cultural experience, it is not very difficult to argue 
that African customary law has received more limitations than are necessary in a 
free and democratic society. 
Given this scenario, it might be appropriate for the country to reassess the 
potential value of  traditional systems in the now fast-changing world. Kenya’s 
legal system faces substantial challenges in the area of  dispute resolution such as 
backlog of  cases, delays in the adjudication of  matters, high costs of  litigation 
and alien juridical languages and convoluted procedures. To these hurdles, the 
authors of  the 2010 Constitution prescribe prompt dispensation of  justice; the 
promotion of  alternative forms of  dispute resolution including reconciliation, 
mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms; and the ad-
ministration of  justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities; among 
others, as viable solutions.66 
Perhaps African customary law and institutions could be seized to give ef-
fect to these constitutional requirements. Such structures, where available, are 
capable of  being deployed in adjudicating small claims and other civil matters in 
66 Article 159(2), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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the areas of  family, succession, death and burial without much regard to prohibi-
tive formalities and technicalities of  procedures. 
There is equally room for consistent development of  the common law of  
Kenya through judge-made law as Okoth-Ogendo suggested way back, there be-
ing sufficient areas of  consensus in these matters. Already, Ojwang J has led the 
way by, for instance, refusing to be persuaded, in Janet Ngubia Githieya v Wairimu 
Gitau, that,
[t]he practice of  cremation, which is well recognised worldwide, and which appears to be a 
hygienic and an environmentally-wholesome mode of  disposal of  the dead, cannot in these 
modern times be accommodated under the evolving Kikuyu customary law or indeed any 
other customary law in force in this country.67 
The Jesang precedent, discussed above, is also instructive that with necessary 
modifications to both the ‘received’ common law and African customary law, it 
is possible to reinvent the family, as well as resolve the numerous land issues that 
clog our judicial systems. 
Some legislative reforms are also tenable. As Cotran suggested way back 
in 1989, Parliament should make up its mind on what aspects of  customary law 
should apply. This should effectively do away with repugnancy clauses and other 
criteria demeaning to African customary law.
67 HCCC No. 667 of  2004.
